Senior Research Associate
Blümlisalpstrasse 10, office 303
Phone: +41 78 799 7215
I will be joining the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University starting Fall 2014.
My primary research interest lies in the domain of Mechanism Design, Market Design, and Network Theory. My contribution to mechanism design includes the analysis of fundamental questions of implementation. A recent paper "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation" (joint with Alex Gershkov, Jacob Goeree, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi, Econometrica, 2013) shows that in standard social choice environments with private types Bayesian incentive compatibility is equivalent to dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Subsequently, I extend this result to environments with correlated types in a paper entitled "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation: The Case of Correlated Types.''
Another paper "A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design" (joint with Jacob Goeree) develops a novel geometric approach to mechanism design that exploits classical results from convex analysis and majorization theory to provide a tractable analysis of generally complex resource and incentive constraints.
My work on market design focuses on the analysis of a signaling mechanism in two-sided matching markets. This endeavor shows that the introduction of private signals facilitates match formation for a wide range of environments ("Preference Signaling in Matching Markets" joint with Peter Coles and Muriel Niederle, AEJ: Micro, 2013). Nevertheless, there are instances when signaling precludes match formation ("Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, 2013).
In a recent project "Targeted vs. Collective Information Sharing in Networks" (joint with Alexandru Nichifor) we study information sharing in online social networks (e.g. Google Circles, Facebook).